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Abstract 
We show that credit crises can be Self-Confirming Equilibria (SCE), which 
provides a new rationale for policy interventions like, for example, the FRB’s 
TALF credit-easing program in 2009. We introduce SCE in competitive credit 
markets with directed search. These markets are efficient when lenders have 
correct beliefs about borrowers’ reactions to their offers. Nevertheless, credit 
crises – where high interest rates self-confirm high credit risk - can arise 
when lenders have correct beliefs only locally around equilibrium outcomes. 
Policy is needed because competition deters the socially optimal degree of 
information acquisition via individual experiments at low interest rates. A 
policy maker with the same beliefs as lenders will find it optimal to implement 
a targeted subsidy to induce low interest rates and, as a by-product, generate 
new information for the market. We provide evidence that the 2009 TALF 
was an example of such Credit Easing policy. We collect new micro-data on 
the ABS auto loans in the US before and after the policy intervention, and we 
test, successfully, our theory in this case. 
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Introduction
Overview. The recent global crisis has been characterized by high uncertainty -
not just risk - regarding the state of the economy. This uncertainty showed up in credit 
markets in the form of perceived counterpart risk, resulting in high lending rates and, 
in some cases, complete market freezes. As policies of lowering the cost of money 
seldom translated into a substantial improvement of the credit conditions (the Euro 
area crisis is an example), policy makers started implementing never-experimented -
so called non-conventional - policies of credit-easing. These policies were specifically 
designed to partly ensure private lenders against the perceived counterpart risk in 
specific and important credit markets under pressure.
However, from a theoretical point of view it is not obvious how to rationalize these 
interventions. Why is a policy maker, who faces the same uncertainty as the private 
sector, willing to take risks that the private sector does not want to take? For example, 
robust decision theory1 is often applied to address the problem of designing policies 
in situations of high uncertainty; however, this approach leads to recommendations 
of prudence, which does not seem to be a characteristic of recent unconventional 
policies.
Possibly the most relevant risk-taking credit-easing policy has been the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF) by which the the Federal Reserve 
Bank provided ABS buyers with a subsidy contingent on losses, counting on the 
backing of the US Treasury. The introduction of TALF in the AAA-rated ABS market 
– completely frozen in late 2008 – coincided with a rapid recovery of transactions. 
Surprisingly, the recovery occurred without any subsidy actually being dispensed: a 
proof, in retrospect, that the counterpart risk perceived by the private sector in that 
market was indeed excessive. Should we conclude that in that occasion the Fed was 
less risk averse, better informed, or just lucky? In sum, which market failure can 
credit-easing alleviate that other policies cannot?
In this paper we develop a theory of optimal policy in situations of high economic 
uncertainty, which can encompass policy experiences like the TALF, without being 
specific to them. We provide three original contributions: first, we develop the theory 
of self-confirming equilibrium in a competitive environment to characterize credit 
crises due to excessive perceived counterpart risk; second, we show that in this envi-
ronment a credit-easing policy of subsidizing lenders’ losses can be an optimal policy 
for a monetary (and fiscal) authority sharing the same subjective beliefs as the pri-
vate sector, and third, we provide new micro-evidence concerning the effect of TALF 
policy in the US automotive AAA-rated ABS in 2009, which is consistent with our 
theory.
Competitive SCE. In section 2 we introduce Self-Confirming Equilibria (SCE) in a 
competitive directed search model of the credit market, consisting of a continuum of
1See Hansen and Sargent (2014) or Adam and Woodford (2012).
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lenders and borrowers. Lenders borrow money from the interbank market, and offer
fixed interest rate loans to borrowers, who apply for loans to finance their – possibly
risky – projects. The basic mechanism is simple: a borrower can implement a riskless
project at a fixed cost, or a risky project without cost. Therefore, the borrower adopts
a safe project only when both the fixed cost and the interest rate offered are sufficiently
low. However, lenders do not observe borrowers’ costs of adoption. Hence, lenders
may overestimate counterpart risk – believing that adoption costs are higher than
they actually are – and only offer high interest rate loans. As a result, only risky
projects are financed. Thus credit crises can emerge in the form of high-interest-high-
risk SCE in which lenders have correct beliefs about equilibrium outcomes, although
they may be wrong about the never-observed counterfactual in which low interest
rates induce borrowers to adopt safe projects.
Self-Confirming Equilibria, as originally introduced in Game Theory by Fudenberg
and Levine (1993), have two distinct properties. First, subjective and objective proba-
bility distributions coincide in equilibrium, but may not coincide outside equilibrium;
that is, agents may have misspecified beliefs about never-realized states of the econ-
omy. Second, agents’ actions determine what is observable in equilibrium; that is,
individual actions can potentially produce the observables that correct these misper-
ceptions2.
In Macroeconomics, Sargent (2001) and Primiceri (2006) used the concept of SCE
by modeling the learning problem of a major actor who has the power to affect ag-
gregate observables and hence can be trapped in a SCE.3 In this paper, instead, we
characterize a SCE in a directed search and matching competitive environment, where
individual (atomistic) agents cannot affect equilibrium outcomes, but can affect what
is individually observable within a match.
Our SCE concept is more resilient than the original concept, in game theory (and
macro), on two grounds. First, since lenders choose the interest rate (a continuous
variable), we require that subjective and objective probability distributions coincide in
a neighborhood of the equilibrium, i.e. up to small variations of interest rates (we call
it Strong SCE). Second, even if lenders were infinitely patient, the subjective private
expected value of experimenting is negative. In fact, due to the public nature of the
market, competition erodes any eventual private benefit of “discovering” that low
interest rates induce lower default rates; in other words, in a competitive equilibrium
lenders will run at zero profits anyway.4
Optimal Credit-Easing. In section 3, we study the problem of a Ramsey planner
2It should be noticed that in the macro literature sometimes the term SCE is (mis-)used by account-
ing only for the first feature but not accounting for this second key feature, as for example in Sargent
et al. (2009).
3In their case, the Fed was taking actions based on a theory of the economy, which was supported
by the outcomes determined by the FED policy, but that would had been confuted if the FED had
taken different actions.
4By contrast, in repeated games, learning rents do not generally disappear, and patient experimen-
tation eventually pays off.
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who takes into account the directed search equilibrium constraints, and has neither
more information nor less uncertainty than lenders have5. As is well known, com-
petitive directed search is efficient, in the sense that the decentralized market fulfills
the constrained optimal allocation.6 This implies that a Ramsey planner – with the
same (or more pessimistic) beliefs as lenders – will choose to implement the same
allocation achieved by the decentralized market, unless an instrument that can affect the
distribution of matches is available.7
A subsidy to lenders targeting an interest rate (which requires fiscal backing)
allows the Ramsey planner to directly affect the payoffs of lenders and borrowers,
determining the split of the surplus independently from the distribution of matches.
We characterize credit-easing as the optimal policy that takes the form of a fixed
subsidy to eventual lenders’ losses, financed by lump-sum taxes paid by borrowers.
The policy maker can induce different market interest rates by properly adjusting the
subsidy (i.e. the policy maker solves an " optimal implementability problem’). In
particular, with the subsidy, lenders offer loans at the targeted interest rates. Hence,
the subsidy acts as an implicit tax to lenders who offer interest rates different from
the targeted interest rate. This implicit tax takes the form of lower matching rates
for offers at non-targeted interest rates. Furthermore, the subsidy has the property of
restoring the Hosios condition at the targeted interest rate.
We also show that an optimal subsidy can be made contingent on eventual lenders’
losses when targeting a sufficiently low interest rate. In the case that no losses real-
ized, no subsidy will actually be given! Thus, at no cost, the policy could both reveal
and implement a low-interest-low-risk REE, which will eventually persist even once
the policy expires. Of course, if such a low-interest-low-risk REE does not exist (i.e.
borrowers do not have low risk projects to finance), then the policy will bear a finite
cost. Thus, the social expected value of such experimental policy is likely to be largely
positive even when evaluated with the same subjective beliefs of lenders!
Evidence on the TALF. In section 4, we show that our theory can rationalize
recent credit-easing policy interventions, such as the TALF, which has the features of
our optimal subsidy. In general, it is difficult to empirically distinguish models of
SCE based on incomplete knowledge, from models of multiple REE based on payoff
externalities (as in Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011)). To overcome this difficulty, we
5Notice that we depart from the literature that studies QE policies, which usually assumes that
private banks are subject to incentive or informational constraints, while the Central Bank is not (e.g.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Correia et al. (2014)).
6As we show, any SCE in our environment satisfies the Hosios’ efficient matching condition (Moen,
1997), although, as we emphasize, this only ensures local – rather than global – efficiency.
7For example, in our model, a central bank conventional policy instrument, such as an interest
rate, is not effective because it is typically a " local instrument’ and therefore in a locally efficient
equilibrium should not be used (unless the economy parameters are just at the margin); furthermore,
not being targeted to specific markets, it may not be optimal to use it as a " global instrument’ to
implement large deviations in all markets. Similarly, a less conventional policy, such as QE liquidity
provision to banks, is not effective since more liquidity does not change the pessimistic beliefs of the
banks.
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collected micro data relative to issuance and riskiness of AAA-rated auto loan ABS
before and after the implementation of the TALF. In this market, the likelihood that
an auto loan is repaid is not influenced by the likelihood that other auto loans are
repaid. Thus, an observed change of regime from high-risk-high-interest to low-risk-
low-interest, which we show to be independent from aggregate conditions, can only
be attributed to a self-confirming mechanism, as payoff externalities do not exist in
this market.
Our unique dataset provides information on the effect of the TALF on the riskness
of the underlying retail market of auto loans. Initially, we observe a high-risk-high-
interest regime. Our theory would say that, before the TALF, the market was in a
risky SCE, where, given the information available to lenders, increasing interest rates
was an optimal choice to minimize losses. This is what we find in an econometric
analysis of the pre-TALF sample: higher interest rates are associated with smaller
losses. Then, the introduction of the TALF made the interest rates on the newly gen-
erated Auto ABS, and consequently on the underlying Auto loans, to fall dramatically
and stayed low even after the end of the TALF. Our theory would say that this is the
effect of learning that sufficiently low interest rates generate smaller losses. This is
indeed what we find looking at the post-TALF sample: lower interest rates are asso-
ciated now with smaller losses. We interpret the information embedded in these two
subsamples as capturing the beliefs of Auto companies before and after the TALF,
beliefs which were justified by their own experience in the market. We finally run a
regression discontinuity analysis that uses the whole dataset and find evidence of a
switch in the effect of interest rates on losses, after the introduction of the TALF. This
last exercise demonstrates that the riskiness of Auto loans was indeed affected in a
non-linear way by interest rates, which in our model is a condition for the emergence
of a self-confirming credit crisis.
Other related work. This paper belongs to a broad research agenda on financial
market crises and related policy interventions. Examples of causes of the disruption
of financial intermediation in literature are: i) tighter incentives, as in Gertler and
Karadi (2011) and Correia et al. (2014); ii) pervasive " adverse selection ", as in Chari
et al. (2014) and Tirole (2012), or " moral hazard’, as in Farhi and Tirole (2012); iii)
coordination failures as in Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) and iv) deterioration of
collateral value, as in Gorton and Ordonez (2014). In contrast to existing work, our
mechanism specifically relies on uncertainty about out-of-equilibrium states and it
applies to models that have a unique rational expectations equilibrium. Furthermore,
our policy prescriptions are different from those derived when other credit-freeze
mechanisms are in place: we vindicate credit easing as a targeted subsidy policy, but
not other conventional (lower interest rates) or unconventional (liquidity provision)
policies, which are, in general, ineffective in self-confirming credit crises. Nor do we
propose more interventionist policies – such as " direct lending’ from the Central
Bank – which can be very costly and may not dissipate pessimistic beliefs. Our work
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also relates to the literature that studies " price discovery’, as in Kim et al. (2012), in
the context of REE models. Finally, by its modeling, our work also connects to the
search and matching literature which builds up on the strategic interaction within a
match, as in Guerrieri et al. (2010). Ours is the first to demonstrate the possibility of
SCE in competitive directed search models and to show the power, in reestablishing
efficiency, of a targeted subsidy policy in the context of a Self-Confirming Crisis.
2 Self-Confirming Crises in Competitive Markets
This section introduces Self-Confirming Equilibria in a model of competitive search
for credit. Competition strengthens the resilience of this equilibrium concept, in con-
trast to its original formulation in game theory. We use the model to describe how
a deterioration of fundamentals can induce the economy to slide from an efficient
equilibrium into a Self-Confirming crisis.
2.1 A simple game of the credit market
We start by describing the credit relationship between a single lender and a single
borrower. For the sake of clarity, we introduce a minimal pay-off structure and focus
attention on a one-period economy; it will be clear in due course that none of the
main insights of the paper hinge on these simplifications.
A borrower
A borrower can obtain liquidity from a lender to invest in a project which re-
quires one unit of investment. A lending contract specifies an interest rate R that
the borrower pays to the lender at the end of the period. Given credit conditions
characterized by an interest rate R, a borrower chooses the type of the project.
The borrower can invest in one of two types of project, namely a safe (s) or a
risky (r) one, which differ in their likelihood of success and implementation costs.
Table 1 below summarizes the borrower’s payoff for the different kinds of project.
Both types have the same conditional per-unit return: in the case of success it is
1 + y with y > 0, whereas it is 1 in the case of failure. Safe projects do not fail,
but their implementation requires a fixed per unit cost of k. Risky projects do not
have any fixed per-unit additional cost, but they can fail with a probability of 1− α.
Finally, only in the case of success does the borrower need to pay 1+ R to the lender,
otherwise the borrower repays just the capital 1. The two options available to the
borrower are characterized by a state ω ≡ (α,k) belonging to Ω ≡ {[0, 1], R+}, which
denotes the couple of parameters α and k related to the returns of the risky and the
safe options, respectively.
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Projects (α, k) Safe (s) Risky (r)
Success
cost: 1+ R+ k
return: 1+ y
probability: 1
cost: 1+ R
return: 1+ y
probability: α
Failure
cost: 1
return: 1
probability: 0
cost: 1
return: 1
probability: 1−α
Table 1. Borrower’s payoffs.
Formally, a project adoption is an action denoted by ρ that belongs to {s, r}. For a
given ω and R, the optimal adoption policy is then
ρ∗ (R,ω) ≡ arg max
{ρ∈{s,r}}
{pib (ρ;R,ω)}, (1)
with
pib (r;R,ω) ≡ (y− R)α, (2a)
pib (s;R,ω) ≡ y− R− k, (2b)
where pib(ρ;R,ω) is the expected net return associated with the project {s, r} of a
borrower, given an interest rate R and a state ω. The participation of the borrower in
the market requires that R 6 y.
A lender
A lender is an agent that has access to the money market, but who cannot imple-
ment projects. A lender borrows money at a rate, δ, and chooses the interest rate R at
which she makes a take-it-or-leave-it lending offer to a borrower. The lender observes
the choice of the borrower only ex-post, so contracts are restricted to a fixed R.
The expected net return of a loan depends on the interest rate R, the cost of money
δ, and the choice of the borrower ρ. In particular, the latter determines the probability
that the project will succeed and hence a loan can be repaid. In particular, if the lender
offers a contract at an interest R and the borrower chooses ρ∗ (R,ω) the expected net
return will be
pil(R; ρ∗ (R,ω) , δ), (3)
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with
pil (R; r, δ) ≡ αR− δ, (4a)
pil (R; s, δ) ≡ R− δ. (4b)
Implicitly we assume that the money market is a secured market; on the contrary
in the credit market liability is limited, as only the project income is pledgeable.
Therefore, the lender bears the cost of an eventual failure on the part of the borrower.
Modeling counterpart risk
The surplus generated by a credit relationship, i.e. the sum of agents’ payoffs, is
independent of the level of the interest rate R. In the case of a risky project the sum
of the interim surplus is αy − δ whereas in the case of the safe project it is y− k−
δ. Therefore as soon as y − k/(1 − α) becomes positive, the surplus generated by
adopting the safe project is larger.
However, the borrower has no interest in adopting the safe option when offered a
too-high interest rate. Specifically, for a given R, the borrower will choose to imple-
ment a safe project if and only if α (y− R) 6 y− k− R or
R 6 R¯ ≡ y− k
1−α
.
Whenever R¯ is negative – which occurs when k > (1 − α)y, that is, the fixed cost
associated with the safe project is sufficiently high – borrowers will never adopt the
safe technology no matter what interest rate R, is offered at.
Therefore R¯ is an important parameter in the choice of the lender. The lender
needs to understand the extent to which a lower R can induce the borrower to im-
plement a safe project, which is not subject to default risk8; R¯ represents the highest
interest rate compatible with safe project adoption.
Nevertheless, computing R¯ requires knowing the payoff structure of the borrower,
i.e. the values y, k, and α. Whereas it is natural that an agent observes her own
payoffs, it is less obvious that she can directly observe all the underlying incentives
of other players. This is the key idea motivating the formulation of a Self-Confirming
equilibrium, which in our case takes the following form:
Assumption (A): A lender does not know the payoff structure of a borrower, but can
observe project adoption ex-post.
As a consequence, the lender is a-priori uncertain about the actual behavior of the
borrower. Such uncertainty generates counterpart risk in the lending contract as the
borrower’s choice ρ affects the returns of the lender.
8We refer to default risk as: the risk that interest rates are not repaid by the borrower at the end of
the contract.
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In particular, we can think of the set of available project as a random variable
ω˜ which is distributed on Ω according to an objective density function φ(ω˜).9 Our
simple specification implies φ(ω˜) is degenerate with mass one on a particular value
ω. We can then denote by β(ω˜) the subjective density function of a lender, describing
her beliefs about the probability that a borrower has access to a set of choices charac-
terized by ω ∈ Ω. In particular, for a given R and δ, Eβ [pil(R; ρ∗ (R, ω˜) , δ)] denotes
the expected lender’s profit evaluated with the probability distribution induced by β,
where
Eβ [(·)] ≡
∫
Ω
(·)β (ω˜)dω˜, (5)
is a subjective expectation operator. Note that we allow for subjective density func-
tion β(ω˜) to possibly - but not necessarily - differ from the objective density func-
tion, φ(ω˜). Nevertheless, we assume that supp(φ(ω˜)) ∈ supp(β(ω˜)) and, moreover,
lenders’ beliefs comply with Bayesian updating.
More generally we will maintain the notation φ(ω˜) or simply φ in the rest of
the paper, whenever the analysis is not restricted to the specific pay-off specification
that we have described above. Finally, without loss of generality, and to keep nota-
tion compact, we assume Eβ[Eφ[(·)]] = Eβ[(·)], that is, the subjective expectation of
the objective mean is the subjective unconditional mean. This is nothing else than
a consistency condition for beliefs to be rationally formed, it ensures that the subjec-
tive probability distribution is believed the best estimate of the objective probability
distribution.10
Fragility to patient experimentation in non-competitive environments
The simple setting just introduced can be used to briefly discuss the game-theory
notion of self-confirming equilibrium and help to illuminate one of its limitations.11
To do so, let us assume for a moment that a lender could only choose between two
interest rates, namely Rh and Rl, such that Rh > R¯ > Rl and Rhα < Rl.
If the lender knows the payoff structure of the borrower, she would understand
that the dominant strategy is to offer Rl, anticipating that the borrower has an interest
in implementing the safe project. Nevertheless, under the assumption (A), a lender
can well entertain beliefs about R¯, namely R¯e, such that Rh > Rl > R¯e. In this case a
lender will never offer Rl.
A Self-Confirming equilibrium is one in which the lender offers Rh and the bor-
rower implements risky projects. In this situation, even ex-post the lender will not
observe the counterfactual in which the borrower adopts a safe project in response
to an offer Rl (i.e. that indeed Rh > R¯ > Rl). Therefore, the equilibrium itself does
9We use a tilde to denote a random variable, x˜, in contrast to one of its particular realizations, x.
10In any case, a relaxation of this assumption is innocuous to the following analysis, although would
force us to keep track of the double expectation.
11For a formal and exhaustive discussion refer to Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
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not produce any observables that can confute lenders’ beliefs, i.e. lenders’ beliefs are
self-confirmed. In a Self-Confirming equilibrium the strategy of the lender is not a
violation of Bayesian rationality in any respect, neither ex-ante nor ex-post.
Of course, one can wonder to what extent such an equilibrium is robust in the
context of a repeated game. After any repetition, the lender will observe (or infer)
either the value of α if the last project of the borrower was risky, or otherwise k.
Therefore, the lender could play Rl to assess the reaction of the borrower and then
exploit this piece of information for future repetitions: i.e. the lender can experiment.
The choice to experiment involves a trade-off. On the one hand, a one-period devia-
tion from the believed best action Rh generates an expected opportunity cost. On the
other hand, if the lender discovers unexploited opportunities, the information yields
a rent for future repetition of the game, whose value can potentially be unbounded.
Thus, a lender who is patient enough and can secure the eventual gains of the ex-
perimentation will always choose to play the perceived lottery by offering Rl, at least
once. In a dynamic context a Self-Confirming equilibrium is fated to break down
when the lender gives high value to future payoffs, and can secure rents from experi-
ments. In this sense, the game-theory formulation of the Self-Confirming equilibrium
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1993) is fragile to patient experimentation.12
This kind of fragility is common to applications of the Self-Confirming equilib-
rium in Macroeconomics that hinge on the learning friction of a major actor who is
large enough to influence observables (Sargent, 2001; Primiceri, 2006).13 Deviations
from the typical large player framework appear problematic, given the difficulty in
defining settings in which atomistic agents can still retain the power to affect what
they observe. In the following, we will overcome this difficulty. We will provide a
static characterization of Self-Confirming equilibrium in competitive environments.
We will then argue that competition makes Self-Confirming equilibria robust to pa-
tient experimentation, so that the main insights from the static model naturally extend
to dynamic frameworks.
2.2 From games to competitive markets
Below, we present a competitive search and matching environment where credit
relationships are formed randomly. We characterize Self-Confirming equilibria within
this environment. We consider the class of linear economies characterized by the
generic payoff functions pib(ρ;R, ω˜) and pil(R; ρ, ω˜) with pibR = −pi
l
R, for a given ρ and
a generic distribution φ(ω˜).
We focus on a static economy and then discuss how the insights naturally extend
into a dynamic version. In contrast to non-competitive economies, even if lenders
12It should be noticed that the game-theory literature has developed conditions to overcome this
limitation of SCE. For a recent study see Battigalli et al. (2015).
13Such a major actor is typically a policy maker that, implementing policies based on a misspecified
theory, prevents available data from revealing the misspecification.
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are infinitely patient, competition dries out the private incentives of experimentation,
exactly as in a models of investment in R&D where discoveries are public goods.
Matching in the credit market
Atomistic lenders and borrowers match to form a credit relationship in the context
of a competitive direct search framework, as intoduced by Moen (1997) along the
simplified variant described by Shi (2006). We normalize the mass of borrowers to
one, whereas we allow free entry on the side of lenders.
Each lender can send an application for funds replying to an offer of credit posted
by a borrower. The search is directed, meaning that at a certain interest rate R there is
a subset of applications a (R) and offers o (R) looking for a match at that specific R.
The per-period flow of new lender-borrower matches in a submarket R is determined
by a standard Cobb Douglas matching function
x (a(R),o(R)) = Aa(R)γo(R)1−γ (6)
with γ ∈ (0, 1). This assumption, which is standard in the literature, ensures a con-
stant elasticity of matches to the fraction of vacancies and applicants, for each submar-
ket R.14 The probability that an application for a loan at interest rate R is accepted
is p (R) = x (a(R),o(R)) /a(R) and the probability that a loan offered at R is finally
contracted is q (R) = x (a(R),o(R)) /o(R). Once the match is formed, the lender lends
one unit to the borrower at rate R. We will say that a submarket is active if there is at
least a contract posted.
Borrowers send applications once lenders have posted their offers. A borrower
sends an application to one posted contract R among the set of posted contracts H to
maximize
J(R) ≡ p (R)Eφ[pib (ρ∗ (R))], (7)
where pib (ρ∗ (R)) stays for pib(ρ∗(R);R, ω˜), and
ρ∗ (R) ≡ arg max
ρ∈{s,r}
{Eφ[pib(ρ;R, ω˜)]} (8)
with Eφ[(·)] being analogous to (5). In (7)-(8) we assume that borrowers apply for
credit and invest without knowing the realization of their individual state ω, which
ensures p(R) being independent of ω˜. The competitive behavior of borrowers implies
that the mass of applicants to a submarket R′ ∈ H, namely a(R′) increases (resp.
decreases), whenever J(R′) > J(R′′) for each R′′ ∈ H (resp. J(R′) < J(R′′) for at least
a R′′ ∈ H). Competition among borrowers implies that J(R) is equalized across the
14In particular, the ratio θ (R) = a (R) /o (R) denotes the tightness of the submarket R. The tightness
is a ratio representing the number of borrowers looking for a credit line per-unit of vacancies. Notice
that the tightness is independent of the absolute number of vacancies open in a certain market.
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posted contracts, i.e. more profitable contracts are associated with lower probabilities
of matching.
Lenders are first movers in the search: they choose whether or not to pay an entry
cost c and, once in the market, at which interest rate R they post a contract. A posted
R is a solution to the lender’s problem:
max
R
Eβ[q (R)Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))] − c], (9)
subject to
p (R)Eφ[pib (ρ∗(R))] = J¯, (10)
and
q (R) = A
1
1−γp (R)−
γ
1−γ , (11)
where J¯ is an arbitrary constant15 and pil (R; ρ∗(R)) replaces pil (R; ρ∗(R), δ). Note that
(11) is a direct implication of (6). The constraints (10) and (11) make sure that the
individual lender takes the probability of matching in a submarket as given. Such
probabilities are evaluated according to the subjective probability distribution β(ω˜).
Lenders cannot individually affect the distribution of offers and applications, and in
particular, the expected utility granted to borrowers. Thus, the competitive behavior
of borrowers implies that (10) holds, which together with (11), defines q(R).
On the side of the lenders, free entry guarantees competition, so that the mass
of lenders posting a contract in the submarket R, namely o(R), increases (resp. de-
creases) whenever Eβ[V(R)] > 0 (resp. Eβ[V(R)] < 0), where
V(R) ≡ q (R)Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))] − c, (12)
is the value of posting a vacancy. Competition among lenders impliesmaxREβ[V(R)] =
0, i.e. at the equilibrium lenders run at zero profits.
Notice that, in order to solve (9), a lender needs to anticipate the reaction of the
borrower ρ∗ (R, ω˜) to an offer R, to determine both the probability q(R) that an offer
R is accepted and the default risk associated with it. Hence a lender bears the risk
associated with the probability that a contract is not filled and the uncertainty, or
possible misperception, concerning the payoff incentives of lenders.
Equilibria: SSCE and REE
We present the definition of Strong Self-Confirming Equilibrium (SSCE) and we
contrast it to the notion of Self-Confirming Equilibrium (SCE) and the one of Rational
Expectation Equilibrium (REE).
Definition 1 (SSCE). Given an objective density function φ(ω), a Strong Self-Confirming
15Here, we emphasize that the lender does not need to know the equilibrium value of J(R), but just
that she cannot affect it.
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equilibrium (SSCE) is a set of posted contracts H∗ and beliefs β(ω) such that:
sc1) for each R∗, the maximizing value for the borrower J(R∗) = J¯;
sc2) each R∗ solves the lender’s problem (9)-(11);
sc3) there is an open neighborhood of R∗, namely = (R∗), such that for any R ∈ = (R∗) it is
Eβ [V(R)] = Eφ [V(R)] , (13)
that is, borrowers correctly anticipate lenders’ reactions only locally around the realized
equilibrium contracts.
The third condition (sc3) restricts lenders’ beliefs β(ω˜), regarding borrowers’ ac-
tions, to be correct in a neighborhood of an equilibrium R∗. This is a stronger restric-
tion on beliefs than the one usually assumed within the notion of Self-Confirming
Equilibrium (SCE), which instead does not contemplate any belief restriction out of
equilibrium. In fact, at a SCE, condition (sc3) holds punctually for any R∗ rather than
for any R ∈ = (R∗).
Crucially, the definition of SSCE does not require lenders to have correct beliefs
about non-realized out-of-equilibrium behavior. This leaves open the possibility that,
in a SSCE, better contracts outside of the neighborhood of the equilibrium could be
wrongly believed by lenders to be strictly dominated by existing ones. In particular,
lenders may misperceive the actions the borrowers would take – and the resulting
risks – when offered lower interest rates. Since such contracts will not be posted,
then in equilibrium there do not exist counterfactual realizations that can confute
wrong beliefs, neither ex-ante nor ex-post.
A REE is a stronger notion than a SSCE requiring that no agent holds wrong out-
of-equilibrium beliefs. In the present model this is equivalent to impose that lenders’
beliefs about borrowers’ payoffs are correct. In such a case the equilibrium contract
is the one which objectively yields the highest reward with respect to every possible
feasible contract.
Definition 2 (REE). A rational expectation equilibrium (REE) is a Self-Confirming equi-
librium such that, at any R ∈ <, (13) holds that is, lenders correctly anticipates borrowers’
reactions for any possible contract.
A REE obtains from a tightening of condition (sc3) in the definition of a SSCE.
This implies that every R∗ ∈ H∗ is such that lenders can exactly forecast the out-of-
equilibrium value of posting a credit line, as they can correctly anticipate borrowers’
responses. Therefore, posting in the submarket R∗ is a globally dominant strategy
both from an objective and a subjective point of view.
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Equilibrium Characterization
We now provide a characterization of an equilibrium. We develop a non-marginal
technique that can be generally used to identify the equilibrium of search and match-
ing economies with non convex payoff structures, and potentially multiple local max-
ima. As we will show, the Hosios condition obtains from a linear local approximation
of the global criterion.
Plugging constraints into the objective16 we can derive the condition for an equi-
librium contract as:
R∗ = arg max
(
A
1
1−γ J¯−
γ
1−γEβ[pib (ρ∗(R))]
γ
1−γEβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))] − c]
)
,
so that, after defining
µ(R) ≡ Eβ[pib (ρ∗(R))] γ1−γEβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))], (14)
we have the following lemma as a direct consequence.
Lemma 1. Consider two contracts posted respectively at R1 and R2. From the point of view
of a single atomistic lender
Eβ [V (R1)] > Eβ [V (R2)]⇔ µ (R1) > µ (R2) , (15)
for any profile of contracts offered by other lenders.
Note that the evaluation of R does not depend on J¯, i.e. it does not depend on
the level of utility granted to the other side of the market, which a single lender
cannot affect. However, lenders partly internalize the welfare of borrowers, as con-
tracts that provides better conditions for borrowers are more likely to be signed. In
particular, with γ = 0, when all the surplus is extracted by lenders, (15) becomes
Eβ
[
pil(R1; ρ∗(R1))
]
> Eβ
[
pil(R2; ρ∗(R2))
]
that is, at the equilibrium only the interim
payoff of lenders is maximized, as borrowers will always earn zero. With γ = 1
on the other hand, when the whole surplus is extracted by borrowers, (15) becomes
Eβ
[
pib(ρ∗(R1))
]
> Eβ
[
pib(ρ∗(R2))
]
that is, only the interim payoff of borrowers is
maximized as lenders will always earn nothing.
Let us introduce here a definition of local maxima of µ evaluated by the system of
beliefs β and φ, respectively.
Definition 3. A contract R′ is a β-local maximum for the lender if there exists a neighborhood
of R′, namely I(R′), such that
µ(R′) = sup
R∈I(R′)
µ(R), (16)
16Remember, to simplify the notation, we are looking at the case Eβ[Eφ[·]] = Eβ[·], which avoids the
necessity of keeping track of the double expectation.
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with Mβ denoting the set of β-local maxima. An interior β-local maximum is a contract R
such that
µ (R)
(
γ
1− γ
1
Eβ[pib (ρ∗(R))]
−
1
Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))]
)
= 0, (17)
with Mˆβ ⊆ Mβ denoting the set of interior β-local maxima. The corresponding sets of local
φ-maxima, namely Mˆφ and Mφ, obtain for β = φ.
The definition above allows a simple characterization of the equilibria as follows.
Lemma 2. For a given φ(ω˜) and β(ω˜), a set of contracts H∗ is a SSCE but not a REE if
any R∗ ∈ H∗ is such that: i) R∗ = supMβ, ii) R∗ ∈ Mφ but R∗ 6= supMφ; whereas it is a
REE if any R∗ ∈ H∗ is such that: R∗ = supMβ = supMφ.
The requirement R∗ ∈Mφ is a direct consequence of having β = φ locally around
the equilibrium. Of course, (17) is satisfied locally by any interior SSCE (or REE), i.e.
an equilibrium where neither incentive-compatibility nor participation constraints
are binding. In such a case we can obtain a marginal condition on the elasticity of
the µ(R) function which identifies the local maximum. The criterion (17) reduces
to the famous Hosios (1990) condition, that is, R∗ is such that pib = γ(pib + pil) and
pil = (1− γ)(pib + pil).
Robustness to Patient Experimentation
In contrast to the non-competitive versions of the self-confirming equilibrium, our
characterization is robust to experimentation by highly patient agents. To sketch our
argument we shall extend our static economy to an infinite horizon economy where
each period is a repetition of our one-period version. A SSCE in this environment
is a sequence of static SSCE. The only key difference is that now beliefs are updated
dynamically in light of the equilibrium realizations of the period before. Of course,
given that lenders’ beliefs are correct at the equilibrium, what a lender will observe
along the equilibrium path is of no help in refining their beliefs.
We ask ourselves whether, when the competitive economy is on a SSCE, a patient
lender, who is aware of her ignorance, has any incentive to experiment with lower
interest rates. The answer is "no" and follows as a consequence of two very general
points.
First, any individual deviation from the equilibrium is perceived to be costly.
This is of course true by definition of any equilibrium. Notice that, in this respect,
the restriction to a one-period contract is innocuous we could extend the model to
include richer contract specifications, without altering the conclusion that on a SSCE
each lender perceives that deviating entails a loss (big or small does not matter) with
respect to the status quo.
Second, all the information generated by the market is public, i.e. there are no
informational rents. This condition is a pre-requisite for a decentralized economy to
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achieve a competitive outcome. The implication is that the outcome of any eventual
deviation from the equilibrium will be observed by all competitors and used to up-
date beliefs. This argument does not require specification as to which information
is produced or observed, but only that if a deviation produces information which
is sufficiently informative for a single lender to update beliefs, then all lenders will
update beliefs in the same way. As a result, the zero-profit condition will necessarily
hold after any individual deviation, whatever the outcome may be.
In the end, competition dries out lenders’ profits so that they always expect to
earn zero profits at any equilibrium: there are no informational rents that the in-
dividual lender could eventually exploit in this environment. Individual gains are
only possible out of equilibrium. Nevertheless, deviations from an equilibrium, are,
by definition, expected to yield negative profits. Therefore, the typical fragility of
self-confirming equilibrium to patient experimentation in non-competitive environ-
ments does not apply in competitive ones. For this reason, the insights of our simple
static formulation are no less general that the ones we could obtain in any dynamic
extension of the model.
2.3 Self-Confirming credit crises
We use now our simple specification – with pay-offs (2) and (4), and a given ω –
to describe how an economy can slide into a Self-Confirming crisis.
The first step to compute equilibria is to work out the set Mφ to which a SSCE
belongs. We can use (17) to compute the interior local maximum relative to safe and
risky project choice, respectively. Next, we check whether such contracts are within
the bounds imposed by incentive-compatibility and participation constraints. Note
that, conditional on a particular project choice, the problems are nicely concave, so
that a unique maximum typically arises.
Proposition 1. For a given ω, the set of φ-local maxima is Mφ = {R∗s,R∗r} where R∗s =
min(R¯, Rˆs) with
Rˆs = (1− γ) (y− k) + γδ, (18)
provided that R∗s > δ, and R∗r = min(y, Rˆr) with
Rˆr = (1− γ)y+
γ
α
δ (19)
and it exists if R∗r > R¯.
Proof. Postponed to Appendix A.1
Rˆs and Rˆr represent interior local maxima, namely the contracts which locally
maximize lenders’ profits when no constraints are binding; converely R∗s and R∗r ac-
count for the possibility that constraints do bind. In particular, R∗r > R∗s, that is, ceteris
paribus, risky projects imply higher interest rates. Nevertheless, the expected profit
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of both a borrower and a lender can be higher when a risky project is implemented
depending on parameters (for example, when α = 1).
Let us now characterize the set of REE, i.e. supMφ.
Proposition 2 (REE). For a given ω, there exists a threshold value αˆ(k) which is decreasing
in k and belongs to (α(k),α(k)), where
α(k) =
y− Rˆs − k
y− Rˆs
and α(k) =
y− δ− k
y− δ
,
such that:
(i) if α < αˆ(k) then supMφ = {R∗s},
(ii) if α > αˆ(k) then supMφ = {R∗r},
(iii) only for α = αˆ(k) then supMφ = {R∗r ,R∗s}.
Proof. Postponed to Appendix A.2
The proposition establishes that for a sufficiently high level of riskiness (α < αˆ)
the safe equilibrium is the unique REE, otherwise the risky equilibrium is the unique
REE. The threshold αˆ is the only value of α where two REE exist in this model. This
threshold lies in (α,α) that is, the interval for which Rs > R¯ > δ.
We state now the existence of a unique equilibrium contract which is SSCE but
not REE.
Proposition 3. For a given ω, only R∗r can be SSCE without being REE. In particular, for
R∗r ∈ Mφ it is supMβ = {R∗r} without being supMφ = {R∗r} provided that : α < αˆ and
Eβ[k] is sufficiently high so that Eβ[αˆ(k)] < Eβ[α] = α.
Proof. Postponed to Appendix A.3
The two conditions for the existence of a risky SSCE that is not a REE are intu-
itive. First, the safe equilibrium must be globally a strictly dominant contract when
evaluated with the objective distribution. Second, lenders must believe that it is suf-
ficiently unlikely that borrowers will adopt the safe project if they lower the interest
rate i.e. they expect to be in a risky REE. A sufficiently high level of k is, for example,
Eβ[k] > (1−α)r.
There are two features of a SSCE that are worth noticing. First, the model has the
important feature of generating a unique determinate SSCE that is not a REE, char-
acterized by having excessive credit tightening and risk taking. Hence, missbeliefs
can only sustain credit crises. Second, the beliefs that sustain a Self-Confirming crisis
should satisfy a threshold condition, which is compatible with belief heterogeneity.
Moreover, considering risk aversion or ambiguity would expand the set of beliefs that
sustain a Self-Confirming crisis.
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Figure 1: Weaker fundamentals create room for a Self-Confirming crisis.
Figure 1 illustrates our findings in the space (α,R). Our baseline configuration
is r = 0.03, δ = 0.008,k = 0.005,γ = 0.4, c = 0.001,A = 0.1. The feasible range
of equilibrium interest rates compatible with the adoption of a safe (resp. risky)
technology is the region below (resp. above) the dotted thin curve representing the
adoption frontier of borrowers. For any α, Rr and Rs are denoted by the upper and
lower thick lines. In particular, the red solid line denotes the unique REE for a given
α > αˆ. For α < αˆ the unique SSCE which is not REE is plotted in solid blue. The
dotted red line represents the REE safe equilibrium for α < αˆ.
We are ready now to describe how a transition from a REE period to a Self-
Confirming crisis can happen. We can think about a credit crisis as determined by
an exogenous fall in α. When the risk is low (αhigh = 0.9) then the unique REE is
the risky equilibrium where borrowers only adopt risky projects which, in fact, are
not very risky. This is optimal. When risk increases up to a sufficiently high level
(αlow = 0.55), rational expectation would predict that the lenders switch to the low
interest rate regime. In the logic of Self-Confirming equilibria, whether or not the
"jump", occurs at the right point crucially depends on lenders’ expectations about
the counterfactual reaction of borrowers. In particular, the actual borrowers’ reaction
to low interest rates could not materialize as long as lenders keep posting high in-
terest rates. Therefore, the trap is self-confirming, as high interest rates, justified by
perceived counterpart risk, induce risky choices by borrowers.
Figure 2 illustrates the individual maximization problem corresponding to the sit-
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Figure 2: In a Self-Confirming crises, an increase in risk implies higher interest rates.
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Figure 3: At a Strong Self-Confirming Equilibrium, a lender perceives a out-of-
equilibrium lottery with negative expected value.
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uation plotted in previous figure. On the x-axis we represent R, i.e. the individual
choice of a lender. On the y-axis we measure the expected pay-off of the individual
lender Eβ[V(R)] when all the other lenders post at the equilibrium R. Thus, the figure
shows the individual incentive to deviate from an equilibrium prescription. When
risk is low (α = αlow as in figure 1) the maximization problem of the lender is repre-
sented by the convex solid red curve, whose maximum at RA yields zero, as implied
by the zero profit condition. After an exogenous increase in risk (α = αhigh as in fig-
ure 1) the maximization problem becomes the solid blue line. The new curve peaks
at RB > RA, accounting for bigger risk premia factored into interest rates. Moreover, a
discontinuity arises for a sufficiently low interest rate, as a result of the uncertainty of
a lender about the counterfactual reaction of a borrower. In particular, in this exam-
ple, we consider the case β(k = 0.005) = 0.07, whereas the probability that the state
is β(k = 0.015) = 0.93 where, notice 0.015 > r(1− α) that is, k = 0.015 is too high to
induce a safe adoption for any feasible level of R.
Figure 3 illustrates the perceived lottery of the lender. The lower dotted blue line
denotes the lender’s payoff in the case k = 0.015, whereas the higher dotted blue line
represents the case k = 0.007. In the latter, an individual deviation from RB to RC,
with all other lenders posting at RB, would yield a large profit. Nevertheless, this
possibility is believed with too small a probability to induce an individual deviation.
This is a necessary condition for RB to be an equilibrium. Hence, a set of misspecified
beliefs can sustain a SSCE that is not a REE when, as in our example, an existing
globally optimal state for the lender is not believed to be sufficiently likely. Such
misbelief cannot even be confuted ex-post because, given that only high interest rates
are offered, no borrower adopts the safe option in equilibrium.
The maximization problem of a lender when all other lenders post at the unique
REE interest rate RC (unique conditionally to α = 0.55 and k = 0.007) is represented
by the dotted red curve in figure 3. The local and global maximum is at RC and yields
zero profits. This is useful to illustrate how competition dries out private incentives
of experimentation in a dynamic extension of the model. Suppose for a moment that
(despite pessimism) a lender discovers that posting RC grants profits i.e. k = 0.007 is
known with certainty now. This outcome will be observed by other competitors who
in turn will choose to post RC, fulfilling the zero-profit condition anyway.
Finally, figure 4 plots the equilibrium social welfare, measured in terms of cost-
per-vacancy c, as a function α. Colors and traits are used to distinguish the REE from
the other SSCE, as in figure 1. Note that since lenders run at zero expected profits,
the social welfare coincides with the expected profits of borrowers. Social welfare is
increasing in α (and so decreasing in Rr) when the economy is on a risky equilibrium,
whereas it is insensitive to risk at a REE where borrowers adopt safe projects.17 The
effect of a Self-Confirming crisis triggered by an increase in fundamental risk is a
17Social welfare is decreasing in α when α ∈ (α, α¯) i.e. the safe equilibrium arises as a corner
solution.
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Figure 4: Social welfare in a self-confirming crisis.
dramatic decrease of social welfare. The drop would have been much lower in the
REE instead. How would a policy maker, who shares the same beliefs as lenders act
in a Self-Confirming crisis?
3 Credit Easing as an optimal policy
In this section, we demonstrate how a targeted subsidy from the central bank
to the private lenders, financed by borrowers, can be a powerful tool for breaking
a socially inefficient equilibrium. Under fairly general conditions, we show that if
the objective of the CB is to maximize ex-ante social welfare, this is equivalent to
maximize the interim total surplus of a match between a borrower and a lender when
an optimal subsidy is implemented. Moreover, the CB will implement the policy
whenever it assigns positive probability to the existence of a REE associated with
strictly higher ex-ante surplus.
On the other hand, the lenders’ private evaluation of the policy does not align
with the social evaluation. The subsidy moves the whole distribution of matches
and, therefore, lenders will always expect to earn zero profit.
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3.1 Welfare evaluation of laissez-faire economies
Let us first analyze the problem of a benevolent social planner who maximizes
social welfare, by choosing R as a policy instrument, subject to the directed search
competitive restrictions, and in particular, the free entry lender’s expected zero profit
condition, which means that the planner maximizes J(R). Importantly, we will pro-
vide the planner with the same subjective beliefs of the lenders, and no fiscal capacity,
i.e. without power to operate transfers between lenders and borrowers. We will call
this a laissez-faire economy, i.e. one in which a planner has no other instrument than
R to affect the terms of trade.
The problem of a planner without fiscal capacity is:
max
R
Eβ[p (R)Eφ[pib (ρ∗(R))]], (20)
subject to
c = q (R)Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))]
and
p (R) = A
1
γq (R)−
1−γ
γ ;
i.e, the social planner maximizes social welfare taking the zero profit condition and
the market tightness as a constraint. Notice that in (20) the subjective beliefs are those
of the planner. Here we assume that they share the same beliefs, β, but in general
there may be different.
As before, by plugging constraints into the objective18 we can derive the con-
strained first-best contract as
R? = arg max
(
A
1
γc−
1−γ
γ Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))]
1−γ
γ Eβ[pib (ρ∗(R))]
)
,
so that after defining
µ¯(R) ≡ Eβ[pil(R; ρ∗(R))] 1−γγ Eβ[pib(ρ∗(R))], (21)
we have a criterion to rank the welfare generated by different contracts. From here
onward, we will use a ? to denote a policy outcome, as opposed to ∗ denoting a
market outcome.
Lemma 3. Consider two alternative laissez-faire economies trading at interest rates R1 and
R2, respectively. From a the point of view of a planner:
Eβ [J (R1)] > Eβ [J (R2)]⇔ µ¯ (R1) > µ¯ (R2) , (22)
for any profile of contracts offered by other lenders.
18Remember, to simplify the notation, we are looking at the case Eβ[Eφ[·]] = Eβ[·], which avoids the
necessity of keeping track of the double expectation.
22
Comparing (22) and (15) we can easily see that the two criteria are maximized for
the same equilibrium contract, i.e. R∗ = R?. We therefore obtain the following propo-
sition, which is a version of the wellknown result on the efficiency of the directed
search competitive equilibrium:
Proposition 4. In a laissez-faire economy where lenders and the planner have the same sub-
jective beliefs, the competitive allocation is a solution to the planner’s problem.
The proposition states that in an economy in which the social planner has no
other instrument than R to alter the terms of trade, the socially preferred allocation
coincides with the one determined by the decentralized market. It reproduces the
standard result on the constrained efficiency of directed search equilibria, except that
in our context it is a local equilibrium result when the planner and the competitive
agents (private lenders) share the same subjective beliefs.
3.2 Welfare evaluation with a subsidy as policy instrument
In this subsection we will introduce the possibility that the social planner can use
linear transfers between borrowers and lenders, when she shares the same beliefs as
lenders. The availability of a fiscal instrument introduces the possibility of compen-
sating for the hold-up problem produced by pessimism on safe project adoption, and
therefore of implementing the competitive equilibrium that maximizes social welfare.
Optimal subsidy
We construct a structure of transfers that have two desirable features:
i) the transfer that an agent - a lender or a borrower - expects in a match is inde-
pendent of her individual action;
ii) the subsidy is financed by a tax on the fraction of matched borrowers.
To satisfy condition i), we consider a subsidy to lenders d(R, ρ∗(R)) contingent on
general equilibrium objects, namely the equilibrium interest rate R and the equilib-
rium project choice ρ∗(R), which are observable ex-post.19 To satisfy condition ii), we
require that the subsidy is paid by borrowers within a match. The optimal subsidy
d?(R, ρ∗(R)) for a given R is the subsidy that maximizes social welfare when R is the
equilibrium contract. The problem of a planner with fiscal capacity is:
max
R,d(·)
Eβ[p (R)Eφ[pib(ρ∗(R)) − d(R, ρ∗(R))]], (23)
subject to
c = q(R)Eβ[pil(R; ρ∗(R)) + d(R, ρ∗(R))],
19In particular, the fraction of defaults across the population reveals the equilibrium project choice.
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and
p (R) = A
1
γq (R)−
1−γ
γ ,
where d denotes a subsidy to lenders financed by taxing borrowers, such that in
expectation the individual choice of project is correct. Plugging constraints into the
objective20 we can derive the optimal average subsidy for a given R as:
d?(R) = arg
d(·)
max
(
A
1
γc−
1−γ
γ
(
Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))] + d(R)
) 1−γ
γ
(
Eβ[pib(ρ∗(R))] − d(R)
))
,
where d(R) ≡ Eβ[d(R, ρ∗(R))]. Hence, after defining
µ?(R) ≡
(
Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))] + d?(R)
) 1−γ
γ
(
Eβ[pib(ρ∗(R))] − d?(R)
)
, (24)
we have a criterion to rank the welfare generated by different contracts provided
the authority implements the optimal subsidy. In the case of linear economies (i.e.
when pilR = −pi
b
R) the optimal subsidy d
? targeting a contract R satisfies the first-order
condition:
1− γ
γ
1
Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))] + d?(R)
+
1
Eβ[pib(ρ∗(R))] − d?(R)
= 0. (25)
Therefore, the optimal average subsidy targeting an interest rate R satisfies:
d?(R) = (1− γ)Eβ[pib(ρ∗(R))] − γEβ[pil(R; ρ∗(R))]. (26)
Notice that the optimal subsidy implies a split of the total expected interim surplus
determined by the relative elasticities of the matching function to the mass of appli-
cants and offers:
Eβ[pib(ρ∗(R))] − d?(R) = γEβ[S(R, ρ∗(R))], (27)
Eβ[pil(R; ρ∗(R))] + d?(R) = (1− γ)Eβ[S(R, ρ∗(R))]. (28)
where S(R, ρ∗(R)) ≡ pib(ρ∗(R)) + pil(R; ρ∗(R)) is the total interim surplus generated
by the project choice of the borrower as an optimal reaction to an offer R. Finally,
plugging (26) back into (24) gives
µ?(R) = γ(1− γ)
1−γ
γ
Eβ[S(R, ρ∗(R))]
1
γ ,
which, reduces the social evaluation to a simple total expected surplus criterion, given
by log (µ?(R)). As a consequence, we have the following:
20Remember, to simplify the notation, we are looking at the case Eβ[Eφ[·]] = Eβ[·], which avoids the
necessity of keeping track of the double expectation.
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Lemma 4. Consider two alternative subsidized economies trading at interest rate R1 with
subsidy s?(R1) and R2 with s?(R2), respectively. From a the point of view of a planner:
Eβ [J (R1,d?(R1))] > Eβ [J (R2,d?(R2))]⇔ Eβ[S(R1, ρ∗(R1))] > EβS(R2, ρ∗(R2))]. (29)
In general the criteria (22) and (29) do not necessarily coincide. The reason is
that, without the subsidy, the interest rate R determines at the same time both: i) the
incentives of the borrower in the project choice, and ii) the incentive of the lender
to post an offer, which depends on the split of the expected surplus. The presence
of the subsidy makes disentangling these two dimensions possible. In particular,
the optimal subsidy achieves an efficient share of the (subjectively expected interim)
surplus for a given R, so that now R can be targeted to induce lenders to select the
type of project which maximizes the surplus.
(Ramsey) Implementability
Since the criteria (22) and (29) may not coincide, there will be situations in which
the planner would like to implement the subsidy and change the decentralized allo-
cation in order to achieve a higher expected welfare. Moreover, in the case of a SSCE
that is not REE, the policy constitutes a social experiment, as it is based on subjective
beliefs β, which can be misspecified. In such a case the policy has the effect of pro-
ducing evidence that can correct beliefs and clear uncertainty. A temporary policy
intervention could be necessary to break the spell of misbeliefs about counterpart
risk.
As we have seen, the design of the optimal subsidy is an exercise in optimal
implementation. As a result, the authority can induce whatever equilibrium contract
she prefers by means of the subsidy. To see this, suppose the authority targets a
certain R? and implements the subsidy d?(R?). The private evaluation criterion in the
case of a subsidy becomes:
µ(R,d?(R)) ≡
(
Eβ[pib (ρ∗(R))] − d?(R)
) γ
1−γ
(
Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))] + d?(R)
)
(30)
where µ(R, 0) is nothing else than (14). It is clear that:
µ(R,d?(R)) = µ?(R)
γ
1−γ . (31)
Following our notation for local equilibria, let us denote by Mβ
d?(R)
(resp. Mˆβ
d?(R)
) the
local (resp. interior) maxima of the function µ(R,d?(R?)). Therefore, the first order
condition of µ(R,d?(R)) with respect to R (the analogous to (17)), satisfies
γ
1− γ
1
Eβ[pib (ρ∗(R))] − d?(R?)
−
1
Eβ[pil (R; ρ∗(R))] + d?(R?)
= 0, (32)
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exactly at R? because of (26). The conditions (27), (28) and (32) makes clear that the
optimal subsidy restores optimality locally at any targeted contract in the sense of the
Hosios (1990) condition. We have just demonstrated that the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 5. Suppose the authority targets a contract R? fixing a targeted subsidy d?(R?),
then the lenders’ best reply to this policy is to offer:
R? = supMβ
d?(R?)
= sup Mˆβ
d?(R?)
.
We have shown that, in the case of linear economies, for the decentralized market
to sustain a certain R? it is sufficient that the authority commits to d?(R?). Let us now
clarify under what conditions the authority will decide to implement a subsidy.
Corollary. Consider a decentralized SSCE equilibrium R∗ ∈ Mφ delivering an expected
total surplus S(R∗, ρ∗(R∗)). The authority will implement a contingent subsidy d?(R?) tar-
geting a contract R? whenever Eβ[S(R?, ρ∗(R?))] > Eβ[S(R∗, ρ∗(R∗))].
Furthermore, by the definition of SSCE, Eβ[S(R∗, ρ∗(R∗))] = Eφ[S(R∗, ρ∗(R∗))]. In
sum, the authority will implement the subsidy no matter how small the subjective
probability that total surplus could improve is. The implementation of the subsidy
is, in general, ex-ante the right decision for the authority, irrespective of what agents
can eventually learn after exploring new submarkets (notably, that the status quo was
not a REE). Although the CB in principle has the power to unveil the true state by
experimenting on few matches, she finds it to be worth implementing the policy on
the whole distribution to maximize the expected benefit across the population. On
the other hand, the fact that all the distribution of posted contracts moves after the
subsidy, leaves the lenders at zero expected profits in any case, that is, the private
and social values of experimentation diverge.
Credit Easing as a self-financed social experiment
To gain more intuition on how the use of an optimal subsidy works, it is useful to
go back to our baseline economy with pay-offs (2) and (4), and a given ω. There, a
large enough interest rate, for example R′ such that R′ > y− k/(1 − α), will induce
borrowers to always choose the risky project. In this case, the surplus is S(R′,α) =
αy − δ, whereas the matching yields a surplus of S(R′′,k) = y − k − δ in the case
where the borrowers are offered a positive R′′ such that R′′ < y− k/(1− α). Notice
that whenever such a positive R′′ exists we also have S(R′′,k) > S(R′,α). Therefore,
k < (1−α)y (33)
identifies the condition for which a planner, with the same beliefs as lenders, would
like to target an interest rate satisfying 0 < R < y− k/(1 − α), if the decentralized
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equilibrium does not belong to this range.
In the case of figure 5, we considered an example where lenders believe k = kL =
0.005 with probability pL = 0.07 and k = kH = 0.015, with probability pH = 1− pL.
Therefore, pL is also the probability that S(R,k) = y− k− δ at any R < y− k/(1−α).
In particular, for any positive R < y− k/(1−α), the following inequality
Eβ[S(R,k)] > Eβ [S(R,α)] , (34)
holds. This implies that the authority would like to implement a contingent subsidy
at any R < y − k/(1 − α). Let us focus on the case where the authority targets a
contract R? = RC = R∗s (note that RC < y − k/(1 − α)), which is the best contract
conditional to the realization of the good state kL (as shown in Figure 5). In particular,
the optimal targeted subsidy is
d?(RC) = p
Ld?(RC, s) + pHd?(RC, r),
and given that d?(R∗s, s) = 0 then we finally have
d?(RC) = p
H ((1− γ)α(y− RC) − γ(αRC − δ)) .
The subsidy satisfies (32), so that lenders - all of them - strictly prefer to post offers
at RC. This is illustrated by the curved green line in figure 5, which represents the
expected payoff when the the subsidy d?(RC) is implemented. The peak of the green
line is exactly at RC, where the zero profit condition is satisfied. Notice that in this
case lenders reply to the credit easing policy by offering loans at the interest rate RC
and, at such low interest, borrowers choose the safe technology. As a result, the effect
of implementing a subsidy to the lenders at the cost of taxing borrowers results in no
effective transfer in equilibrium, but in an implicit tax outside equilibrium. Lenders
with beliefs β, as described, perceive that they are being taxed at RB. In practice, once
RC is being offered, borrowers prefer the new choice to the old RB, i.e. the effect is
through a sharp decrease of q(RB). Therefore, a policy of subsidization of lenders at
the expense of borrowers results in an implicit tax to lenders if they do not offer the
planner’s desired equilibrium interest rate.
Finally, let us now demonstrate how a credit easing intervention can be self-
financed in the context of our example. Condition ii) requires that the subsidy to
lenders is financed by a tax to matched borrowers. Nevertheless, in the case of a
risky project adoption, matched borrowers could fail and not have pledgeable in-
come to finance the policy. To ensure that the policy is self-financing, we shall con-
sider individual-specific taxes on borrowers db(R, ρ∗(R), i) where R and ρ∗(R) are still
general equilibrium objects, whereas i ∈ {c, f} denotes the state of the project of the
borrower being either a success (c) or a failure (f). The realization of the state i, it
should be noted, is not under the control of a borrower, so that condition i) is still
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Figure 5: The effect of the optimal subsidy.
satisfied for the borrower. Self-financing, in our example, implies:
db(RC, r, c) = α−1d(RC, r) and db(RC, r, f) = 0,
so that αdb(RC, r, c)+ (1−α)db(RC, r, f) = d(RC, r). This structure of contingent trans-
fers ensures that at any equilibrium R the government can finance the subsidy to
lenders relying on the same pleadgeable income on which private contracts also rely.
In practice, in equilibrium each matched borrower finances in expectation a matched
lender. Moreover, note that y− RC > d?(RC,α) always holds. In particular, in case kH
realizes, matched borrowers with successful projects still have pleadgeable resources
to pay the tax. This makes sure that the fiscal plan can be self-financed in any possible
state of the world, and, it also implies borrowers still have incentives to participate in
the market despite the tax.
4 The case of TALF in the Automotive ABS market
The objective of this section is to provide evidence in support of the self-confirming
mechanism implied by our theory, which cannot be explained by alternative mecha-
nisms of self-fulfilling liquidity traps. To this aim, we collect and analyze micro-data
on the effect of the 2009 TALF - the most significant (and controversial) US credit-
easing intervention - on the evolution of riskiness and market value of the underlying
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securities.
A brief history of the TALF
This facility [TALF] will provide three-year term loans to investors against
AAA-rated securities backed by recently originated consumer and small-
business loans. Unlike our other lending programs, this facility combines Fed-
eral Reserve liquidity with capital provided by the Treasury, which allows it to
accept some credit risk... If the program works as planned, it should lead to
lower rates and greater availability of consumer and small business credit.
(Ben Bernanke, January 13, 2009)21.
Asset Backed Securities (ABS) are assets through which private companies liqui-
date credit that they have with their customers. The value of an ABS is the value of
claims over future receivables originated from an underlying pool of credit contracts.
ABS cover important sectors of the US economy such as home equity, automotive,
students loans, credit cards, to quote the principal four.
In the second half of 2007 the ABS market experienced a sudden contraction after
a constant increase in volume since early 2000 (see figure 6).22 The crash was mostly
driven by lower-than-expected returns in the housing markets, which depressed the
value of subprime home equities. The dramatic increase in perceived risk and the lack
of confidence in rating agencies resulted in an abrupt freeze of the AAA-rated ABS
segment, whose interest-rate rose at exceptionally high levels reflecting unusually
high risk premiums (see figure 7). Private liquidity collapsed rapidly, and investors
directed available resources to quality assets like Treasury bills, which almost doubled
their daily volume of trade from 40 to 80 USD billion during 2008-2009.
Within this context, the Fed stepped in with the launch of the Term Asset Backed
Securities Lending Facility (TALF) which supplied about 71 billion of non-recourse
loans at lower interest rates, to any U.S. company which could provide highly rated
(AAA and AAA-) collateral. The TALF was set in such a way that, if the ABS given
as collateral fell sharply in value, an investor could put the collateral that secured
its TALF loan back into the hands of the Fed, losing only a collateral haircut of 15%.
Thus, TALF constitutes a subsidy contingent on credit losses on the underlying ABS
security, eventually financed by the US Treasury. This intervention was made primar-
ily to sustain the credit market in a period of high perceived counterpart risk. More
precisely, the Fed acted as a borrower of last resort, taking the risk of experimenting
with contractual conditions which were perceived as too risky by the private sector.
Despite malign prophecies welcoming the birth of the programs, on 30 September
2010, the Fed announced that more than 60% of the TALF loans had been repaid
21“The Crisis and the Policy Response”, the Stamp Lecture, London School of Economics; the em-
phasis is ours.
22New issuances of consumer ABS plunged from $50 billion per quarter of new originations in 2007
to only $4 in the last quarter of 2008.
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Figure 6: Amounts issued in the US ABS market for different categories.
Figure 7: Interest rate spreads in the AAA-rated Auto and Credit Card ABS market.
30
in full, with interest, ahead of their legal maturity dates. In other words, the more
favorable conditions offered by the Fed, instead of triggering an adverse selection
process, were the prelude to a remarkable business performance. The NYFed, which
was in charge of the operations, finally announced that "as of May 2011, there has not
been a single credit loss. Also, as of May 2011, TALF loans have earned billions in
interest income for the US taxpayer".23
How can our theory explain the effect of TALF?
The aim of this section is to demonstrate that our theory can be used to rationalize
the TALF intervention and its success. We already saw that the TALF intervention
increased the value of ABS, providing insurance against perceived counterpart risk.
In particular, by providing a non-recourse loan at very low interest rates against the
85% of the value of an AAA-rated ABS, the Fed was offering an implicit subsidy con-
tingent on the loss on the ABS being higher than 15% of its market value. However,
this fact alone does not imply yet the key mechanism of our theory, which relates to
the effect of the TALF on the underlying market for the ABS security. In particular,
our theory would predict that:
1. during the crises, losses and interest rates were both rising;
2. the introduction of TALF translated into a decrease of the interest rates applied
by financing companies to their customers;
3. after TALF, loans became less risky than that which could have been predicted
by using all information available in the market before TALF intervention;
4. after TALF interest rates remained low as a consequence of firms learning that
low interest rates generate low losses.
In other words, through the lens of our theory, the crisis of the ABS market is
the result of an increase in the underlying riskness of the economy that triggered
an increase in interest rates and an increase in losses, evolving in a spiral of self-
confirming pessimism. In such a context the TALF insured companies against the
perceived counterpart risk, companies stopped charging risk premia and competition
mechanically drove their interest rates down. This way, the policy maker produced
the counterfactual which eventually corrected firms’ misbeliefs: lower interest rates
actually yielded lower rather than higher losses. As a consequence, the TALF subsidy
was never implemented, although the recovery was permanent.
Of course, at the same time there was a general recovery in the US economy.
Therefore, to test our theory we need to isolate the effect of TALF from other business
cycle externalities. In particular, to argue that our mechanism is in play, we need to
23Source: http://www.newyorkfed.org/education/talf101.html
31
exclude the possibility that the recovery of the market could be explained by models
of multiple REE, as per the one of Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011), based on liquidity
externalities.24 We designed the following empirical strategy to overcome all these
difficulties.
4.1 The ABS automotive market
Why look at the Automotive Market?
First of all, let us explain why the automotive market constitutes an excellent
case for our analysis. The automotive ABS is the second most significant category of
ABS, after credit card, in terms of amount supported by the TALF, about 3 million
US$. We choose to look at this market because the peculiar characteristics of the
underlying contracts make our analysis particularly informative. Below, there is a list
of the advantages that this market offers for the purposes of our research inquiry, in
contrast to the most obvious alternative, namely the credit card market.
• There are no cross-customer externalities. It is hard to argue that, in the Auto
loans market, lower interest rates to new customers may affect the likelihood
of repayment of old customers, which may by contrast happen for credit cards
(even controlling for the business cycle). Importantly, the absence of this char-
acteristic rules out potential explanations that requires multiple REEs.
• The contract is only based on a fixed interest rate. In an automotive loan
contract there is no particular structure of delay fees or renegotiation procedure,
which conversely may differentiate across credit card contracts.
• We can control for the duration and amount of the loan. In an automotive
loan contract, once the amount of the loan and the interest rate is fixed, monthly
payments will follow according to a pre-determined schedule. By contrast, with
a credit card loan the amount of the loan depends on the current propensity to
consume, and the debt can in principle be indefinitely rolled-over.
• We can control for the collateral. Automotive loan contracts are secured loans;
the collateral is typically the car which originated the debt. Credit cards are
typically unsecured credit.
• We can control for the wealth of customers. The company issuing the auto-
motive loan is typically the same company which is selling the car. Thus, the
company is an indicator of the wealth of the customer (i.e. the one who buys a
BMW is typically richer than the one who buys a Honda), which is simply not
the case with credit card companies (almost everyone can have a Visa).
24Notice that the evidence on liquidity effects of the TALF at the single security level have proven
very small. On this subject see, for example, Ashcraft et al. (2011), Ashcraft et al. (2012) and Campbell
et al. (2011).
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Taking advantage of all these useful features comes at the mild cost of stretching
the interpretation of our simple payoff structure a little. In the case of the automotive
market, a project must be interpreted as a car, so that the project return is a flow of
utility given by possession of a car. The fixed cost k meanwhile shall be interpreted
as the effort (in terms of portfolio management) needed to avoid a stochastic liquidity
shock which, when it hits, forces the agent to miss her payment and, as a consequence
of the delinquency, to lose the car. In the end, this interpretation is not crucial. Our
payoff structure aims to simply reproduce a demand for credit whose quality (i.e.
probability of repayment) increases as the agreed interest rate decreases.
Dataset on Automotive AAA-rated ABS
We collected data on Asset Backed Securities (ABS) in the US automotive sector for
9 different issuers in the automotive sector who appear in the balance sheet of the
New York Fed as being accepted as part of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF) program starting in March 2009. In particular, we collected all the
available free, online information on Trusts issued from 2007 to 2012, a time span
which includes the introduction of TALF25.
Company (i)→ BMW Carmax Ford Harley Honda Hyundai Nissan Lease Nissan Owner World Omni
Year of issuance
2007 2007-1 2007-1 2007-A 2007-1 2007-1 2007-A 2007-A 2007-A 2007-A
2007-2 2007-B 2007-2 2007-2 2007-B 2007-B
2007-3 2007-3 2007-3
2008 2008-1 2008-B 2008-1 2008-1 2008-A 2008-A 2008-A 2008-A
2008-A 2008-B 2008-2 2008-B 2008-B
2008-2 2008-C 2008-C
2009 2009-1 2009-1 2009-A 2009-1 2009-A 2009-A 2009-1 2009-A
2009-A 2009-B 2009-2 2009-2 2009-B 2009-A
2009-2 2009-C 2009-3 2009-3
2009-D 2009-4
2009-E
2010 2010-1 2010-1 2010-A 2010-1 2010-1 2010-A 2010-A 2010-A 2010-A
2010-2 2010-B 2010-2 2010-B 2010-B
2010-3 2010-3
2011 2011-1 2011-1 2011-A 2011-1 2011-1 2011-A 2011-A 2011-A 2011-A
2011-2 2011-B 2011-2 2011-2 2011-B 2011-B 2011-B 2011-B
2011-3 2011-C
2012 2012-1 2012-1 2012-A 2012-1 2012-A 2012-A 2012-A 2012-A
2012-2 2012-B 2012-B 2012-B 2012-B 2012-B
2012-3 2012-C 2012-C
2012-3 2012-D
Table 1: List of tranches for every issuing company (in bold the Trusts’ eligible col-
lateral under the Federal Reserve Bank’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF)).
Table 1 reports the tranches sorted by issuer for which we have found information.
All the issuing entities listed above have benefited from the TALF programme imple-
25Every year each of these companies delivers into the market a variable number of Trusts (or
tranches). For instance, World Omni in 2008 extended loans in two tranches (2008-A, 2008-B), while
the same company extended only one tranche in 2009 (2009-A).
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mented by the Federal Reserve (those reported in bold in Table 1). The number of
tranches that have been eligible varies by issuer. The program started in March 2009;
however, the loans covered by TALF have been extended by each issuer at different
points in time within the year 2009.26 The sum of the amounts of the loans mentioned
above represents around 46,5% of all ABS-Auto covered by TALF.
The dataset27 includes information on the following three dimensions:28
1. Principal amounts in US dollars. For each of the trust we report the total value
of the the credit pool gathered by the asset. Moreover, we have the breakdown for
different ”Classes” (or Asset Backed Notes) of riskiness, going from the more secure
A1, to the riskiest, C. Only the Asset Backed Notes A1, A2, A3 and A4 are the ones
classified as AAA by rating agencies (i.e. they are above the minimal level of FICO
points credit scores to get the AAA label), hence, the ABS itself to be rated AAA
must be almost entirely (but not exclusively) composed by A-rated Asset Backed
Notes. The evolution of the total principal amounts in our sample is plotted in figure
8 where a different solid line denotes a different A-rated Asset Backed Notes. Note
the collapse of issuance at the end of 2008 and the following recovery in 2009 during
the TALF period. Contrast this with the course of the dashed green line, which
denotes the total value (y-axis on the left) of minimal risk loan issued by US banks
in the same period (source: ST. Louis FRED dataset). The contrast highlights the fact
that the recovery in the automotive market during the TALF intervention coincides
with the deepest depression of the safest credit market in the US economy.
2. Interest Rates. Each tranche for each company is characterized by an average
fixed interest rate for each category where the underlying pool of credit has been
signed.29 The evolution of the weighted average of the interest rate spreads – i.e.
interest rate minus 1-month Libor – fixed at the time of the issuance is plotted in
figure 9. A different solid line denotes a different A-rated Asset Backed Notes. Note
the sharp increase of interest rates at the end of 2008 and the following decrease in
2009 during the TALF period. Contrast this with the evolution of the dotted green
dashed, which denotes the interest rate on minimal risk loan issued by US banks in
the same period (source: ST. Louis FRED dataset). From the comparison we note that
the decrease of interest rates in the automotive market during the TALF intervention
is in stark contrast with a permanent increase in interest rates in the safest credit
26For instance, for BMW Vehicle Lease Trust 2009-1 the prospectus was made in May 2009, while
the correspondent prospectus for Hyundai Auto Receivables Trust 2009 A is September 2009.
27The data have been collected one piece of information at a time from prospectuses pub-
licly available online. The major source utilized is https://www.bamsec.com/companies/6189/208
where the majority of observations are available. The other sources are the issuers’ websites
which sometimes contain Trust prospectuses. Official TALF transaction data are available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_talf.htm#data
28Further details on the composition of the dataset, the sources and the procedure through which
the data were collected are presented in Appendix B.1.
29Few Trusts included a fraction of credit subject to variable interest rates. See Appendix B.1 for an
explanation on how we treat these cases.
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Figure 8: Total quarterly principal amounts issued in our sample for different cat-
egories of riskiness; the dotted line denotes the total amount of minimal risk loans
agreed during the same period by US banks (3-quarter rolling window; scale on the
right axis).
35
market in the US economy at the beginning of 2009.
3. Losses with respect to the original pool balance. On the 15th day of each month
following the date of issuance, the tranche yields the payment received from the pool
of contractors of the originating loans. This amount constitutes the coupon of the
tranche.30 Thus, the investor in the ABS bears the default risk on the underlying
loan contracts. For each tranche, we collected the series of cumulative losses on this
receivables as a percentage of the original pool balance, which is published ex-post by
the company issuing the ABS. For this series, we do not have the different breakdown
across Asset Backed Notes.
For each tranche, the first difference of these series gives the per-month flow of
losses. In figure 10, each point represents the average per month loss relative to
a specific tranche identified by a company and a time of issuance (on the x-axis).
Note that the TALF period coincides with a drastic drop in average losses for each
company. After TALF, losses never again reached the pre-crisis level. The figure
also plots, with a dotted green line, the evolution of credit losses reported by all US
banks in the same period (source: FRED st. Louis Fed). One can notice that while
losses diminished in this market, US banks were experiencing a rapid increase in
delinquencies.
The comparison of the automotive market in our sample with the evolution of
macro benchmarks - such as the ones represented by dotted lines in each picture -
is suggestive of the specific effect of the introduction of the TALF in the ABS mar-
kets. At a first glance, we can distinguish between two periods: a pre-TALF period
where interest rate differentials increase, volumes suddenly fall and losses are high,
and a post-TALF where interest rates fall and stay low, volumes recover and losses
decrease. This evolution is consistent with our interpretation that TALF was effective
in providing the opportunity to learn that lower interest rates were associated with
lower, rather than higher, losses: a conterfactual never previously observed in that
market!
In what follows, we are going to elucidate this statement by means of an econo-
metric analysis that will allow us to distinguish between cyclical and market compo-
nents of losses.
4.2 Econometric analysis
We run two econometric exercises in order to distinguish between local and global
knowledge. By global knowledge we mean the best available knowledge when using
all the information in our dataset, accounting for all possible non-linearities present
in the data; this captures the objective probability distribution φ in our theory. By
local knowledge we mean the best knowledge that firms could had at the time of the
introduction of the TALF, compared with what they learned after the introduction
30Each Trust provides for about 3 or 4 years of payments.
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Figure 9: Quarterly weighted average (each company is weighted by its relative issued
amount) of interest rate differentials from one-month Libor for different categories of
riskiness; the dotted line denotes the interest rate differential from the one-month
Libor on minimal risk loans agreed during the same period by US banks.
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Figure 10: Average monthly loss for each tranche in the sample plotted in its quarter
of issuance; the dotted line denotes losses experienced by US banks in the same
period by US banks (scale on the right axis).
37
of the TALF, considering pre- and post-TALF as two isolated regimes and neglecting
non-linearities as in a first order approximation; this captures the subjective proba-
bility distribution β in our theory, around a neighborhood of the equilibrium. We
show that i) the outcome produced by the TALF contradicts what could have been
predicted extrapolating from all the information available before TALF, and ii) what
companies could learn from the two partial subsamples is consistent with what can
be learned using all the information ex-post available in this market.
Assessing local knowledge
We run two regressions on two different subsamples of our dataset, with a similar
number of observations. The first sample - Sample I - consists of all the data available
before 25 March 2009, which is the date of implementation of TALF. The second,
Sample II, consists of all the data relative to tranches issued after 25 March 2009 for
the following two years, i.e. until 1 April 2011.
On each sample we run the following linear regressions:
Yi,t,T = β0 +β1Xi,T+β2Vali,T +β3LibT + Si+
+β4Libt +β5ut +β6Inft +β7Gdpt +β8Vixt + i,t,T
where Yi,t,T denotes the first differences in monthly cumulative losses (with respect
to initial pool balance) occurring at time t relative to the tranche issued by company
i at time T ; Xi,T stands for the differential of the average interest rate relative to
the tranche (i, T) with the correspondent one-month Libor value at time T ; Vali,T
is the amount issued, which is relative to the tranche (i, T), valued in current US
dollars. Si are company fixed-effects that control for all the time-invariant unobserved
company characteristics. Finally, a set of covariates that control for the business cycle
are included: ut is the US monthly unemployment rate; Vixt is the monthly VIX
index; Libt is the one-month Libor at time t; LibT is the one-month Libor at the time
of the issuance of the relative tranche T ; Inft is the monthly US inflation rate; Gdpt is
the monthly US national GDP growth rate.
The regression aims at capturing the linear relation between interest spreads,
which is a choice variable of the financing companies, and resulting losses, controlling
for a number of tranche-specific factors, and business-cycle variables. This specifica-
tion does not capture eventual non-linearities in our micro-data or in business-cycle
series, as if we were looking at local information produced by first-order perturba-
tions around an equilibrium.31
Sample I provides information on the evolution of losses that one could have
31Note that the truncation of the samples reduces the eventual misspecification. In fact, restricting
the estimation range to values closer to the cutoff point is the basis of the local linear regression
approach proposed by Hahn et al. (2001) which provides a reliable solution for the presence of non-
linearities of the model.
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expected as a consequence of lower interest rates at the time of the introduction of the
TALF. As Table 2 shows, the estimated coefficient is significant and negative, i.e. lower
interest rates were expected to generate higher losses. This finding would explain the
tendency of firms to increase interest rates along the diverging paths documented in
figure 9. Based on these beliefs, the mechanical decrease in interest rates due to TALF
would be expected to generate higher losses for the policy maker.
Sample II is informative about the actual impact that the large decrease in interest
rates induced by the TALF had on losses. The relevant coefficient is now signifi-
cant and positive, meaning that lower interest rates were yielding lower, rather than
higher, losses. This result explains why there was no need to actually implement
the TALF subsidy. This result also explains the tendency of firms to further decrease
interest rates even after the TALF expired, as figure 9 illustrates.
In addition, the variables we included to control for the business cycle have all the ex-
Local Linear Regressions (dependent variable Yi,t,T )
Variable Coef se
Sample I: Pre-TALF issuances, payments until March 2009
Xi,T −0.0237∗∗ (0.0075)
Vali,T 2.07−14 (2.59−14)
Libt −0.0113∗∗ (0.0041)
LibT −0.0043 (0.0057)
ut −0.00001 (0.00001)
Inft 0.0020 (0.0014)
Gdpt −0.0039
∗ (0.0020)
Vixt 0.00001∗∗∗ (2.59−06)
R2 0.5445
Obs. 536
Sample II: Post-TALF issuances, payments until April 2011
Xi,T 0.0200∗∗ (0.0072)
Vali,T −1.11−14 (4.25−14)
Libt −0.0520 (0.0441)
LibT −0.0100∗∗∗ (0.0029)
ut 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.00004)
Inft −0.0010 (0.056)
Gdpt 0.014 (0.0033)
Vixt −0.00001∗∗ (5.48−06)
R2 0.5378
Obs. 589
Standard errors clustered by issuing company. The model includes a constant and issuing company fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: Effect of interest rates on cumulative losses controlling for business cycle
variables.
pected signs when significant. In particular, note that the policy variable Libor always
impacts on losses with a negative sign, in line with several studies that identified the
risky channel of monetary policy. In Sample I, a decrease in the policy rate increases
losses on simultaneous payments. While in Sample II, this effect vanishes, although
the Libor component of the tranche-specific interest rate now exhibits a statistically
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significant negative coefficient. In fact, in Sample II Libor does not change much, as it
is constrained by the zero lower bound; unemployment, on the other hand becomes
significant, as if it was a proxy for a fictitious shadow policy rate.
Assessing global knowledge
Our second econometric exercise is designed to capture the point of view of an ex-
ternal observer that wants to ex-post assess how the introduction of the TALF affected
the impact of the interest spread on the losses. We still run a linear regression using
the whole dataset, but now we introduce time-fixed effects, instead of business-cycle
series, in order to capture any potential non-linearity in time affecting all companies
and all tranches. Our specification is the following:
Yi,t,T = β0 +β1D+β2Xi,T+β3DXi,T +β4Vali,T + Si + St + Sp + i,t,T ,
where we introduce new variables: D, St and Sp. D denotes a dummy which is 1
when the payment belongs to a tranche issued during or after the TALF period, and
0 otherwise. Thus, β3 measures the differential effect of spreads on losses that the
introduction of the TALF generated in the newly issued trust. St introduces a fixed
effect for each date, in such a way as to capture all common factors acting on the
same date; among them there are the business-cycle effects that we included before.
Finally, Sp includes a fixed effect for the number of the payment which is intended
to control for a non-linear deterministic trend that monthly losses can have when
dependent on the number of the payment (e.g. when on average the fourth payment
yields more losses than the tenth). Evidence of a strong non-linear trend in losses is
provided in appendix B.3.
Global Linear Regressions (dependent variable Yi,t,T )
Variable Coef se
D −0.0003∗∗ (0.0001)
Xi,T −0.0042∗∗∗ (0.001)
D ∗Xi,T 0.0108∗∗∗ (0.003)
Vali,T 2.19−14 (3.06−14)
R2 0.6560
Obs. 4169
Standard errors clustered by issuing company. The model includes a constant, issuing company fixed effects, time fixed effect and payment number fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Effect of interest rates on cumulative losses controlling for time-fixed effects.
The results in table 3 confirm the findings of the local linear regressions. The im-
pact of the spread on the losses - namely Xi,T - is negative and statistically significant.
Nevertheless, the differential effect of the same conditional on the TALF being im-
plemented is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the latter is larger than
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the former in absolute terms, and, therefore, the overall effect of spread on losses
is positive during and after the introduction of the TALF. This finding confirms that
what companies could learn from partial subsamples is indeed what can be estimated
using all the information ex-post available in this market.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a new approach to monetary policy in situations of high
economic uncertainty, where private agents and policy makers may misperceive –
and possibly underestimate – the actual strength of the economy. By developing
and applying the concept of Self-Confirming Equilibrium to a competitive financial
market we can characterize a, previously non-captured, form of credit crisis and,
more importantly, we show that Credit Easing can be the optimal policy response,
breaking the credit freeze. While we present a new theory, the paper also emphasizes
that the FRB TALF experience in 2009 can be seen as a frontrunner example, which
we empirically investigate in order to validate our theory.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proposition 1
Proof. To find Rˆs and Rˆr we just apply (17) with (1) and (3). Hence, Rˆs and Rˆr result
after imposing incentive-compatibility and participation constraints and noting that
the two interiors solve well-defined convex problems (so the closer to the interior the
higher the payoff). Note that, at the risky equilibrium, lenders’ participation con-
straint αR∗r − δ > 0 is always satisfied whenever borrowers’ participation constraint
y− R∗r > 0 is too: in fact y > R∗r implies y > δ/α which in turn yields R∗r > δ/α.
A.2 Proposition 2
Proof. The two values α(k) and α¯(k) correspond respectively to R¯ = Rˆs and R¯ = δ.
For α < α(k) we have
µ(R∗r) = pi
b(R∗r ;α,ω)
γ
1−γpil(R∗r ;α,ω) < µ(Rˆs) = pi
b(Rˆs;k,ω)
γ
1−γpil(Rˆs;k,ω),
that is,
γ
γ
1−γ (1− γ)max
{
(αy− δ)
γ
1−γ , 0
}
< γ
γ
1−γ (1− γ)(y− k− δ)
γ
1−γ ,
whenever R¯ > 0 which is true for α < α(k). We conclude that whenever R∗s = Rˆs
thenR∗s is a REE.
For α > α¯(k), contracts that induce the safe adoption require a R lower than the
cost of money δ, which violates the participation constraint of the lender; therefore
R∗r will be the unique REE for α > α¯(k).
For α ∈ (α(k), α¯(k)) we have that R∗s = R¯. The relevant equation for R∗s = R¯ to be
unique REE is
µ(R∗r) = pi
b(R∗r ;α,ω)
γ
1−γpil(R∗r ;α,ω) < µ(R¯|ρ = k) = pi
b(R¯;k,ω)
γ
1−γpil(R¯;k,ω),
that is,
γ
γ
1−γ (1− γ)max
{
(αy− δ)
γ
1−γ , 0
}
<
((
y−
k
1−α
− δ
)(
αk
1−α
) γ
1−γ
)
.
On the one hand, µ(R∗r) is always monotonically increasing in α. On the other hand,
µ(R¯) is always monotonically decreasing in α, given that:
∂
((
y− k1−α − δ
) (
αk
1−α
) γ
1−γ
)
∂α
=
(1−α)γ(y− k− δ) − 2kα
α (1−α)2 (1− γ)
(
αk
1−α
) γ
1−γ
< 0,
42
holds for α ∈ (α, α¯).32 Hence, we can conclude that(
y−
k
1−α
− δ
)(
αk
1−α
) γ
1−γ
= γ
γ
1−γ (1− γ)max
{
(αy− δ)
γ
1−γ , 0
}
,
defines a threshold αˆ(k), such that for α < αˆ(k) R∗s = R¯ is the unique REE, whereas
for α > αˆ(k), R∗r is the unique REE. The hedge case α = αˆ(k) is the only one where
two REE exist. To conclude, note that
∂
((
y− k1−α − δ
) (
αk
1−α
) γ
1−γ
)
∂k
=
(1−α)γ(y− δ) − k
k (1−α) (1− γ)
(
αk
1−α
) γ
1−γ
< 0
holds for α ∈ (α(k), α¯(k)).33 This implies that αˆ(k) has to be decreasing in k.
A.3 Proposition 3
Proof. Suppose lenders play R∗r and that α < αˆ(k). By definition of SSCE their expec-
tations about ρ∗(R∗r ,ω) are correct at the equilibrium, which imply that lenders know
α but can have misspecified beliefs about k. In particular, for a E[k] sufficiently high,
such that αˆ(E[k]) is sufficiently low (by proposition A.2), we can have α > αˆ(E[k])
that implies that lenders wrongly believe that R∗r is the unique REE (i.e. the global
maxima when evaluated by β).
On the other hand, R∗s cannot be SSCE without being REE. Suppose such an equi-
librium exists, then it would arise as a corner solution posted at the frontier R¯ because
it turns out that interior solutions Rˆs are always REE (i.e. the global maxima when
evaluated by φ). Nevertheless, by definition of a SSCE, agents would have correct
beliefs for marginal deviations from the equilibrium that, at the frontier, are indeed
sufficient to induce safe project adoption. Therefore at a SSCE posted along the fron-
tier R¯, agents would know the actual α. Hence lenders can correctly forecast ρ(R,ω)
at any R, and so they cannot sustain a safe SSCE that is not a REE. A contradiction
arises.
B Appendix: Data
B.1 Data on ABS in the Automotive Industry
The data collected are information on Asset Backed Securities (ABS) in the US auto-
motive sector. The data include information on: Cumulative Losses with respect to
the original Pool Balance, Interest Rates, Principal Amounts in US dollars. The infor-
mation is collected for 9 issuers in the automotive sector, namely: BMW Vehicle Lease
32Note that αk/(1−α(k)) in increasing in α and kα/(1−α) = γ(y− k− δ).
33Note that k/(1−α) in increasing in α and k/(1−α(k)) = γ(y− δ) + (1− γ)k.
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Trust, CarMax Auto Owner Trust, Ford credit Auto Owner Trust, Harley-Davidson
Motorcycle Trust, Honda Auto Receivables Owner Trust, Hyundai Auto Receivables
Trust, Nissan Lease Trust, Nissan Auto Receivables Owner Trust, World Omni Auto
Receivables Trust.
Every year each of these companies delivers onto the market a variable number
of Trusts (or tranches). For instance, World Omni in 2008 extended loans in two
tranches (2008-A, 2008-B), while the same company extended only one tranche in
2009 (2009-A). As far as our analysis is concerned, we collected all the free available
online information on Trusts issued from 2007 till 2012, a time span which includes
when Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) was introduced. Table 1
reports the tranches sorted by issuer for which we’ve found information. Each of
these Trusts issued loans of different ”Class” (or Asset Backed Notes): A1, A2, A3,
A4, B and C. Obviously, the Principal Amount of these loans differ by Class, and each
Class is also characterized by a different degree of risk (interest rate). It goes from
the more secure loan with the lowest interest rate (A1) progressively to the riskier
categories (A2, A3 and so on). The Trust will pay interest and principal on the notes
on the 15th day of each month (or the next business day).
All the issuing entities listed in bold in Table 1 was eligible for the TALF program.
The number of tranches that were eligible varies by issuer. The program started in
March 2009; however, the loans covered by TALF have been extended by each issuer
at different points in time within year 2009. The tranches covered by TALF pro-
gramme that are included in the database are sufficiently representative of the whole
sample of Asset Backed Securities covered by TALF in the US automotive sector, since
the sum of the loan amounts mentioned above represents around 46,5% of all ABS
covered by TALF (calculations are our own, reference "TERM ASSET-BACKED SE-
CURITIES LOAN FACILITY DATA" from FED). The data have been collected one
piece of information at a time from prospectuses publicly available online. The major
source utilized is https://www.bamsec.com/companies/6189/208 where the majority of ob-
servations are available. The other sources are the issuers’ websites which sometimes
contain the Trusts’ prospectuses.
Concerning the controls for the business cycle, the data were collected from sev-
eral sources: the monthly US Inflation is calculated as (CPIt − CPIt−1)/CPIt−1 and
the US Consumer Price Index (all items) are taken from OECD (MEI); The US Civil-
ian Unemployment rate not seasonally adjusted comes from the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics; the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) along with the one-month Libor corre-
spondent to the 15th day of each month are from the St. Louis FED data. Lastly,
the monthly GDP Index used to calculate the GDP growth rate is from Monthly GDP
Index - Macroeconomic Advisers.
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B.2 Construction of the variables for the Empirical analysis
Cumulative Losses with respect to the original Pool Balance. The cumulative
net losses for each issuing entity and for every tranche refer to the total pool which 
includes all risk classes. Therefore, data on losses are not available at disaggregated 
class level. The losses are reported monthly and the time span of monthly losses 
varies depending on the date Trusts are issued and the number of payments expected.
Interest Rates. Interest rates vary within Trusts according to the Class being con-
sidered. For some Asset Backed Notes the loans are issued as a combination of fixed 
and floating components of interest rates. For instance, in the case of Ford credit Auto 
Owner Trust 2007-A the Class A2 is divided into the ’a’ and ’b’ components, where 
the ’a’ component extends loans with a fixed interest rate of 5,42% and the ’b’ com-
ponent has the floating rate of one-month Libor +  0 ,01%. In those cases we calculate 
the weighted average of class A2, where the weights are the principal amounts in US 
dollars for each component and the floating component i s substituted by the corre-
sponding FED one-month Libor at the time when the prospectus was made (source: 
http://www.fedprimerate.com/libor.htm). Following this particular example, the weighted 
interest rate for the A2 Class of Ford credit Auto Owner Trust 2007-A whose prospec-
tus was made in June 2007, equals ((5, 42 ∗ 300) + (5, 33 ∗ 287.596))/(300 + 287.596) 
where the one-month Libor in June 2007 equals 5,32%.
The dataset contains both the weighted average of interest rates expressed in lev-
els, as well as the differentials with respect to the corresponding one-month Libor 
at the time when the prospectus was made. The latter is utilized as the variable of 
interest in our empirical analysis. It is calculated as follows: within each tranche 
we first obtain the differential of the interest rates of every c lass with respect to the 
corresponding one-month Libor at the time when the prospectus was made. Then we 
calculate the inter-Class global weighted average of these differentials using Principal 
amounts as weights.
As an example we use World Omni Auto Receivables Trust 2009-A where for the 
Classes A1,A2,A3 and A4 the calculated interest rate differentials are 1,17%, 2,43%, 
2,88% and 4,67%, respectively, while the corresponding principal amounts in US mil-
lion dollars are 163, 192, 248 and 147, respectively. Table 4 gives an example of the 
structure of the data and how the information on Principal Amounts and Interest 
Rates are presented for each tranche in all prospectuses. The resulting weighted aver-
age of interest rate differentials for each Trust is ((1, 17% ∗ 163m.) + (2, 43% ∗ 192m.) + 
(2, 88% ∗ 248m.) + (4, 67% ∗ 147m.))/(163m. + 192m. + 248m. + 147m.).
Principal Amounts in US dollars. Principal Amounts vary within Trusts accord-
ing to the Class being considered. In our empirical exercise, it stands for a control; it 
is included as the sum of the Amounts within each Trust of all Asset Backed Notes. 
In the previous example for World Omni Auto Receivables Trust 2009-A, it enters the 
model as (163m. + 192m. + 248m. + 147m.) = 750m.
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Asset Backed Notes 2009-A Class A1 Notes Class A2 Notes Class A3 Notes Class A4 Notes
Principal Amount 163m. 192m. 248m. 147m.
Interest Rate 1.62% 2.88% 3.33% 5.12%
Payment Dates Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly
Initial Payment Date May 15,2009 May 15,2009 May 15,2009 May 15,2009
Final Scheduled Payment Date April 15,2010 October 17,2011 May 15,2013 May 15,2014
Table 4: World Omni Auto Receivables Trust 2009-A (04-2009; 1m. libor at 0.45)
B.3 Non-linear trend in monthly losses
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Figure 11: Predicted mean of ABS monthly cumulative losses over time: the y axis
has the first differences of cumulative losses with respect to initial pool balance for
each tranche q(t), the x axis reports the time span of ABS repayments
There is a common pattern that emerges for each tranche in the evolution of
monthly losses over time, which tends to peak around the 15th-20th month and then
progressively dies away as time goes by. This means that losses concentrate in the
first half of the life of each trend, whereas late losses can be even positive due to the
recovery of earlier delinquencies. The pattern is well illustrated in Figure 11 which
shows the predicted mean of monthly cumulative losses of ABS over time within
a 95% confidence interval. The resulting decreasing trend over time is determined
by clients’ debt repayments of past instalments (reduction of delinquencies) which
contributes to the flattening of the curve.
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